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The ink has barely dried from the latest deal between the United States and Iran, and analysts have doubts about whether it will produce lasting peace. But there are several lessons that Southeast Asia can learn from the three-and-a-half-month crisis that resulted from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
The distinction between chokepoints and flashpoints matters. Chokepoint has become an increasingly common buzzword used to describe geographic features that are inherently vulnerable to disruption or weaponisation. By contrast, a flashpoint connotes an area that is particularly susceptible to violent conflict or which could lead to a war involving external powers.
The Strait of Hormuz has demonstrated that it is both a chokepoint and a flashpoint: a chokepoint because by restricting the flow of oil and gas through the strait, Iran has proved that it can inflict massive economic strain on the global economy. A flashpoint, because of missile and drone strikes and the sinking of commercial shipping vessels. The area remains tense with multiple states on a war footing.
A recent (misguided) suggestion by Indonesia's finance minister that Jakarta consider extracting tolls from the Strait of Malacca set off concerns across Southeast Asia that the region would be next to experiment with such economic chokepoints. The idea was quickly batted down by Indonesia's Foreign Ministry as well as officials in Singapore, who view the idea with alarm given the implications for the latter's economy, which relies on open sea lanes for commerce.
Nearly a quarter of global seaborne trade and 45% of total seaborne oil pass through the Malacca Strait. So it easily meets the criteria to be considered a chokepoint – but it is not a flashpoint.
Indonesia and Singapore are not about to go to war, despite a tense history of confrontation dating back to independence during the 1960s, when Indonesian President Sukarno launched a policy of Konfrontasi against neighbouring Malaysia and Singapore.
Today, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) prides itself on non-interference in member states' internal affairs.
Institutions matter. Four states – Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand – jointly manage the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) to ensure that the narrow passage remains open to trade. The arrangement benefits all parties as well as the global economy. Without this institution, the Malacca Strait would be just as vulnerable to capricious closure as the Strait of Hormuz.
Finally, the South China Sea is a flashpoint but not a chokepoint. Six different claimants have overlapping disputes in the South China Sea: Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan. China regularly contests the overlapping claims of smaller disputants and has subjected the Philippines to particularly brutal treatment in recent years. China has also militarised artificially constructed reefs and shoals to project its naval power further south, even giving it the ability to strike northern Australia with intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Many fear that a violent confrontation in the South China Sea could trigger a war involving the United States and China. This makes the area a clear flashpoint. However, it is not a chokepoint. Even China, which claims nearly all of the waters in the South China Sea, is unlikely to close off the entire sea to international commerce, given its own dependency on seaborne trade. China imports as much as 80% of its total crude oil through the South China Sea, and nearly a third of all global maritime trade passes through its waters. And despite its considerable and growing naval capacity, Beijing lacks the power to close the entire South China Sea.
An outbreak of conflict is still possible – whether in the South China Sea or Strait of Malacca. As are restrictions on the flow of goods. But for now, as both a flashpoint and a chokepoint, the Strait of Hormuz is a far more combustible area.
Dr Hunter Marston is the Director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Lowy Institute and Project Lead for the Asia Power Index.
This article appears courtesy of the Lowy Interpreter, and it is part of a series on ASEAN's crisis coordination and response mechanisms following a private workshop hosted by the Lowy Institute in June 2026. The project was jointly led by Abdul Rahman Yaacob and Hunter Marston, Director of the Lowy Institute's Southeast Asia Program, with the support of the Australian Department of Defence's Strategic Policy Grants Program.
Fuente: Maritime Executive
